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In this paper, the mechanisms of climate change impacts on the incidence of
civil conflict are tested separately in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) compared to the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) for the period 1981 to 2015. We draw
several conclusions: (i) Climate has a significant impact on economic develop-
ment, through economic growth rate in the MENA, and food production in SSA.
(ii) Economic growth rate and food production index are significant indicators
for social stability reduce the risk of civil conflict, in SSA and MENA, respec-
tively. (iii) A direct impact of climate change on civil conflict is identified. (iv)
Conflict in the previous year increases the probability of civil conflict in SSA by
0.30 pp, and in the MENA by 0.50 pp. Moreover, as the type of political system
and accountability are important control variables in SSA, water availability re-
duces the risks of conflict in the MENA region. However, there appears to be
evidence of different mechanisms in different regions. However, the identification
of stable mechanisms needs to be precisely addressed in future work.
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1 Introduction
Climate change is a global phenomenon, but its impacts are unequally distributed across
regions of the world (Darwin, 1995) due to the diversity of agriculture systems, the re-
silience of human systems, and environmental sustainability. Climate change, in the
absence of appropriate policy responses, can exacerbate already existed political crises
and ultimately lead to civil wars in some territories. Most of the severe negative im-
pacts appear in regions that are (i) highly vulnerable to climate change because they rely
on rainfed agricultural systems that provide a livelihood for a large percentage of these
regions’ populations (Serdeczny et al., 2017). (ii) Where it suffers from water scarcity
as in the Middle East and North Africa’s region, where is likely to experience additional
declines in agricultural yields, resulting in negative effects on rural incomes and food secu-
rity (Zhu et al., 2009; Breisinger et al., 2010). Consequently, economic consequences may
lead to conflicts that are unlikely to occur in developed countries. Africa has been already
identified as one of the regions of the world most vulnerable to the impacts of climate
change (Niang et al., 2017). At the same time, the major focus for civil wars in recent
years has been in sub-Saharan Africa, where 29 of 43 countries suffered from civil conflict
during the 1980s and 1990s (Miguel et al., 2004). Likewise, the Middle East and North
Africa region is expected to become hotter and drier in the future due to climate change
next to its growing dependence on international markets for key staple food products1
(OECD-FAO, 2018). In the dataset, which we use to analyze the results of this paper,
12 of the 18 countries (66%) in the MENA region experienced between 1981 and 2015
civil conflicts. In this paper, we demonstrate empirically climate change effects on the
economies of countries from different regions of the developing world, and its relationship
to civil conflict over the past four decades. We applied the same approach and similar
model specifications as in another part of this research, using cross-country panel data.
Economic growth rate and domestic food production are instrumented by rainfall and
temperature, in addition to other control variables, i.e. variables on good governance and
democracy as well as on demographic and environmental indicators.
Climate, economic development, and conflict relationship has been already demon-
strated intensively in Africa. For instance, positive relationship has been proved between
rainfall and income growth, and its significant relation to the rise of civil conflict prob-
ability in Sub-Sharan Africa for the period 1981-1999 (Miguel et al., 2004). This robust
association has been also found between rainfall and higher food production, but only a
weak and inconsistent link between agricultural production and civil conflict in the second
step of the causal model by Buhaug et al. (2015) in SSA. Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014)
has also proved the impact of extreme drought on the risk of conflict during the period
1977 -2005 in SSA, that the risk of war increases by more than 42% but only 2.5% of this
1OECD/FAO 2018: The Middle East and North Africa: Prospects and Challenges
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effect is channelled through economic growth. On the other hand, Barrios et al. (2010)
proved that rainfall has been a significant determinant for economic growth in Africa,
but not for other developing countries. However, there is another part of the literature
that reached different conclusions, like Ciccone (2011) when he extended the data from
Miguel and his co-authors in 2004, concluded that there is no robust link between tran-
sitory income shocks and civil wars, but reveals strong spill-over effects (Ahrens, 2015),
among others who have reached different conclusions (e.g.,(Burke et al., 2009; Buhaug,
2010; Koubi et al., 2012)). Not surprisingly, that such mixed or inconsistent results have
been observed, even for a single geographic region, due to differences in climate shock
measurement, applied approaches, and model specifications. However, this sequence of
relations in the MENA region has not been studied as intensively as in Africa. Where for
example, Gleick (2014) has pointed out that there is a long history of conflict over water
because of the natural water scarcity, the early development of irrigated agriculture, and
complex religious and ethnic diversity.
The socio-economic development and environmental characteristics of the
MENA and SSA
The MENA:
The MENA region consists of a heterogeneous group of countries ranging from the
high-income oil-exporting countries in the Gulf to middle income and lower-middle-
income countries as well as least developed countries such as Yemen (OECD-FAO, 2018).
The agricultural sector still has a significant share in the economies of most countries
in the MENA region as a source of food and income especially for non-oil producing
countries and is an important vehicle for economic growth (Siam, 2009). Therefore, the
dominant policy in the region concerning development has been the modernization of the
agricultural sector in terms of the production (modern irrigation systems and agricultural
technology) of cereals and livestock initially and later in the development of fruits,
vegetables, and cash crops from irrigated or partially irrigated land (Dixon et al., 2001).
This could be a reason that smallholders could not benefit from public support and have
left them small, technologically backward, and poor (OECD-FAO, 2018). According to
Siam (2009) the demand for food imports has markedly increased because the region is
characterized by a food shortage in most food commodities, thereby seriously aggravated
the shortage of foreign exchange in the majority of the MENA countries, particularly the
non-oil producing countries. About the proportion of arable land from the total land
area in the region, it is limited, estimated at 53 million hectares in the year 2005, with
per capita arable land of only 0.17 hectares, compared to 0.22 hectares at the global
level. In addition to that agriculture uses 89% of the scarce water in the MENA region
compared to 70% at the world level, it has been pointed out by Huang et al. (2016)
that it is the driest region in the world according to the annual precipitation of 166 mm,
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and since the 1970s has became even dryer (Cook et al., 2015). The drought peaked
during the period 2006 and 2009 (Al-Ansari, 2013), during this period e.g., Syria and
Iraq in the region received 10 percent less precipitation compared to the four years prior
to 2006 (Chenoweth et al., 2011). This is also evident from our dataset, Syria and Iraq
received less precipitation during this period, 18 and 23 percent, respectively. Regarding
the effect of temperature, in the region, it was at about 4◦C above average in the 1960s
(Carrington, 2015). The well-being indicator; Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
region reached 734 billion dollars in 2006, which constituted 1.5% of the world GDP.
Its population in the same year was (311 million), i.e. 4.8% of the world’s population,
growing by 2.4% annually during the period 1990- 2006, compared to 1.4% of the world
population (Siam, 2009).
The SSA:
The continent of Africa is commonly divided into five regions, four of which are in
Sub-Saharan Africa. The ethnicity is one of the key drivers of diversity in SSA, therefore,
it is important to take it into account in socio-economic studies (Appiah et al., 2018).
According to Olamosu and Wynne (2015), the gross domestic product of Nigeria and
South Africa accounts for about three-quarters of the SSA’s GDP. The contribution of the
agricultural sector to the GDP ranges from less than 3% in Botswana and South Africa
to more than 50% in Chad, represents 15% of GDP on average. This high contribution
underlines the limited diversification of most economies in the region (OECD-FAO,
2016). However, the significant growth in SSA’ agricultural output is driven by area
expansion and intensification of cropping systems, as opposed to large-scale improvement
in productivity (Brink and Eva, 2009), but the failure to keep pace with the demand
resulting from population growth and income has led to an increase in demand for the
import of commodities such as wheat, rice, and poultry (OECD-FAO, 2016), compared
to agricultural modernization in the MENA. For SSA according to Iliffe (2017) during
2000-2007 significant GDP growth of 3.9 is registered. The population growth rate of
SSA in 2006 was 2.7% (World Bank, 2016).
In the following sections, we present empirical results of economic and social responses to
the impact of climate change over time in two vulnerable regions of the developing world
that differ in their economic, social, political and environmental characteristics.
2 Data and methods
For the estimations of this paper, we use our new collected cross-country panel data
including Sub-Saharan Africa (41 countries) and the Middle East and North Africa (18
countries), for SSA’s countries, we have adopted same sample (countries and years) of
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Miguel et al. (2004)2 and extend it for the period from 1981 to 2015. This new setup
contains data on climate, economic indicators, and civil conflict, as well as political factors,
and social fragmentation with other country characteristics information. We focus on the
conflict incidence (subsumes outbreak of a conflict and continuation of a conflict) as
an indicator of conflict that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a given year.
Conflict data; the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset-V18.13. Economic shocks are
measured by (1) annual economic growth rate; we use a complete and consistent time
series expressed in constant price-US dollars provided by National Account Estimates of
Main Aggregate-United Nations statistics division (UNSD, 2020). (2) food index from
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2016). For climate change,
we have data on temperature from the World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal
(2018), and precipitation data from Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP)
database version 2.3 (Adler et al., 2016)4. The advantage of the GPCP rainfall data
that it includes at the same time both gauge and satellite data, corrects for systematic
errors in gauge measures (Miguel et al., 2004). While data on Polity IV scores which
indicates the level of democracy/ autocracy of a political system in-country (i) time (t)
from Roser (2019) based on Wimmer and Min (2006). Based on Polity IV scores, we
derived an indicator (changes in the political system) here we do not distinguish whether
a political transition undergoing in a dictatorship or under democracy, this is thought to
reflect stability. Besides, we examine the effect of quality of governance (accountability)
(World Bank, 2014). Data on water indicators (FAO, 2017). The index of ethnic and
religious diversity from Alesina et al. (2003). A detailed description of the variables used
to perform the estimates in this paper is provided in Appendix A4.
Estimates of the impacts of climate change as mentioned are undertaken separately for
SSA and MENA from 1981-2015, applying Instrumental variable approach. The model
is first estimated applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) (equations (1) and (2)) using
weather (temperature and rainfall) as instruments for economic growth rate and food
production. We include several additional controls for comparison purposes, particularly
those related to conflicts such as political and social controls. Country fixed effects and
country-specific time trends are included in all regressions to capture time-invariant coun-
try characteristics and additional variation, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at
the country level to allow for a potential correlation between observations for any given
2We kept the same sample of MMS (2004) when we revisited their work using different measurement
strategies and sources of data in another part of the PhD research. Therefore, for this part of the
study, we extended their cross-country (SSA), including MENA countries from 1981 to 2015, data on
similar variables has been updated with most recent versions of the corresponding databases.
3Conflict version 18.1, for download; http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/.
4Adler et al., 2016. An Update (Version 2.3) of the GPCPMonthly Analysis. (in Preparation). Huffman,
G.J., R.F. Adler, P. Arkin, A. Chang, R. Ferraro, A. Gruber, J. Janowiak, A. McNab, B. Rudolf,
U. Schneider, 1997: The Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP) Combined Precipitation
Dataset. Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc., 78(1), 5-20. Longitude and latitude points used in the calculation
of the GPCP data versions 2.3 are in the Appendix A4.2
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country at different times. The relationship between variables included in the analysis
and the significance level could be overstated without clustering standard errors.
Gr_gdpit = ai + bX ′it + diyeart + eit, (1)
food_indexit = ai + bX ′it + diyeart + eit, (2)
The term e is a disturbance term, and these disturbances are allowed to be correlated
across years for the same country in all regressions. Country fixed effects aji are included
in all regressions to capture time-invariant country characteristics that may be related to
civil conflict, and also country-specific time trends yeart to capture additional variation
over time.
Then in the second stage, we estimate the impact of quantified economic outcomes from
the first stage (climate indirect), and the direct impact of climate on civil conflict inci-
dences5 as in equation (3). We apply the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model
introduced by Hansen (1982) with lagged dependent variable (LDV). We test our samples
concerning heteroskedasticity by Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test; the null hypothe-
sis that the error variance is constant was rejected with Prob > chi2 = 0:000 for both
samples.
Conflictit = αi + β · gr_gdpit + γ · food_indexit + δ ·X ′it + σi · yeart + εit. (3)
We have applied IV OLS estimation implemented in STATA to choose instruments for
endogenous variables: GDP growth rate and Food Index. The Sanderson-Windmeijer
(SW) chi-squared and F-statistics test under-identification and weak identification of both
endogenous variables, respectively. The null hypotheses were rejected ( Table 1); SW
Chi-squared with (L1- K1+1) degrees of freedom, where L1 is the number of excluded
instruments and K1 is the number of endogenous regressors: for SSA’s sample, SW chi-
sq equals 134.16 with p-value 0.000 for GDP growth and 71.56 with p-value 0.000 for
Food Index, and SW-F statistics account 24.34 and 12.98 for both regressors, respectively
(greater than 10). For MENA, SW chi-sq equals 45.41 with p-value 0.000 and 183.73
with p-value 0.000, for GDP growth and Food Index, respectively. While SW-F statistics
values are 7.90 and 31.98, for GDP growth and Food Index, respectively. Accordingly,
the chosen instruments are considered strong.
Furthermore, Hansen J statistic test for over-identification restrictions after ivreg2 6.
The joint null hypothesis of the Hansen J test is that the instruments are valid for both
5The incidence of civil war: defined by Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) as the probability of observing
either a new war onset or the continuation of an ongoing war or both (p. 307).
6Hansen-test is done after country fixed effects are removed because an estimated covariance matrix
with dummy variables is not of full rank.
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samples (Table 2), i.e. they are uncorrelated with the error term, the null hypothesis is
rejected with p-value 0.000.
3 Main results
3.1 Climate impacts on economic growth and food production:
first-stage estimations
Based on the estimates for all sample countries in a previous working paper7, the effect of
climate variability on the economic growth rate and food production is mainly the effect
of temperature growth. A 1 pp change in annual temperature growth significantly reduces
economic growth and food index by 0.31 pp and 0.23 pp, respectively. The increase in
temperature during the 16 years after the year 2000 of our time series compared to the
average temperature in the eighties is estimated at 2.17 pp. This implies a reduction
in economic growth and food index by 0.67 pp and 0.49 pp, respectively, during the
period after 2000 only due to the temperature change. However, applying the estimates
to separate regions indicates the source of the predictive power of significance that we
observed with our model in the first paper.
The OLS regression (Table 1) using the new source of rainfall data (the GPCP) that
includes at the same time both gauge and satellite data, separately for SSA and MENA
in this paper shows: (i) A positive correlation between precipitation and both economic
indicators (economic growth rate and food production) but only significant for economic
growth rate at a confidence level of 0.10 in the MENA sample with a coefficient estimate of
3.7%. (ii) Annual growth temperature is negatively related to both economic indicators,
it is highly significant only for food production in SSA (coef. 33.2%) and economic growth
rate in the MENA region (49.2%).
Additionally, in the first stage model for SSA, we observe for economic growth
rate some other statistically significant coefficients; positive on total trade exports, and
negative on political transition indicator in-country (i) time (t). With our data, it appears
that the significant climate determinants for economic growth rate are water variables in
the SSA region. Whereas for the food production index in SSA we also observe some
common significant coefficients; positive on the share of agricultural land and the arable
land, and accountability. In the MENA region, other than the positive impact of
growth rainfall and the negative impact of growth temperature on GDP per capita, this
indicator is affected positively significantly by growth trade exports and the share of
agricultural land, but it is affected negatively highly significant by the share of arable
land and transition in the political system. While the food index is negatively significantly
7If Climate Change Can Trigger Civil Conflict, Can Good Policy Trigger Peace? Empirical Evidence
from Cross-Country Panel Data, by S. Khalifa, S. Petri, Ch. Henning, 2020.
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affected by water stress and political indicators in particular, and positively by the share of
urban population. Although theoretically, one would expect that good governess should
affect economic indicators positively. It is indicated in a study by Emara and Jhonsa
(2014) about governance and economic growth, that most MENA countries in the year
2009 have achieved a relatively high but fragile standard of living for their citizens in the
that is not based on firm governance.
Overall, it is obvious that: (i) There is a positive link as exists in the literature for SSA
e.g, by Miguel et al. (2004) between economic growth rate and growth rainfall and negative
with annual growth temperature, significant in the MENA region with our new data and
model specification. (ii) There is a high negative impact for the share of cultivated area
“arable land” and a positive impact for the share of urban population on economic growth
rate and food production, respectively, in the MENA region. (iii) Changes in a political
system (instability) has a negative impact on economic growth rate in both regions.
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Table 1: First stage results, SSA and MENA from 1981–2015. Dependent variables are:







gr_oil_exp_wdi 0.000001 -0.000002 0.000006 -0.000009
(0.680) (0.276) (0.791) (0.683)
gr_trade_exports 0.136*** -0.0192** 0.0912*** -0.0142
(0.000) (0.039) (0.000) (0.154)
agri_land 0.00286 0.0194*** 0.00683** 0.00659**
(0.290) (0.000) (0.043) (0.040)
arable_land -0.214 0.408*** -1.034** -0.107
(0.189) (0.001) (0.040) (0.822)
water_stress 0.00951** -0.00399 -0.00005 -0.00079***
(0.014) (0.158) (0.599) (0.000)
strength_gr_polityiv -0.00519** -0.00105 -0.00952** -0.00104
(0.029) (0.547) (0.037) (0.811)
gr_gpcp_neu 0.00329 0.00815 0.0371 * 0.00573
(0.919) (0.732) (0.079) (0.775)
gr_temp -0.206 -0.332** -0.492** -0.232
(0.370) (0.049) (0.006) (0.169)
water_1km2 -0.0090** 0.0006 0.000615 -0.000617
(0.016) (0.825) (0.595) (0.575)
rainfall levels 0.00004 -0.00023*** -0.00001 0.00004
(0.544) (0.000) (0.870) (0.483)
polityiv_sh_tr -0.00032 -0.00872*** -0.00405 -0.00703**
(0.837) (0.000) (0.256) (0.039)
accountab 0.00016 0.00278*** 0.00246 -0.00363**
(0.876) (0.000) (0.104) (0.012)
urban_pop -0.00358 0.00299 0.00403 0.0113**
(0.264) (0.205) (0.338) (0.005)
Constant 0.0224 -0.705*** -0.256 -0.452
(0.939) (0.001) (0.505) (0.216)
Observations 1324 1324 612 612
R2 0.15 0.88 0.23 0.85
F 2.327 99.62 3.438 66.36
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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3.2 Economic shocks, direct climate impacts, and incidence of
civil conflicts, second stage estimations
The results of this stage are introduced in Table 2 for SSA and MENA. First, not sur-
prisingly, that civil conflict is more likely when there was a conflict in the previous year
in both regions, increase of around 0.498 pp and 0.302 pp in the probability of current
conflicts in the MENA and SSA, respectively. Second, regarding the impact of economic
shocks on the civil conflict probability, it does not seem to function through the same
economic indicators in both regions, although both indicators show negative coefficient
signs on the incidence of civil conflict. i.e. in the MENA region climate change increases
the probability of civil conflict significantly through reduction in food production index,
and in SSA the effect appears through economic growth rate. Third, for the direct impact
of climate variables on civil conflict incidence, our model yields negative coefficient signs
on growth rainfall in both regions, significant in MENA (ceof. -0.061*). Other than that,
for MENA countries fresh groundwater withdrawal reduce civil conflict incidence statis-
tically significant. While in SSA, political indicators show statistically significant impact
reducing conflict probability.
Overall, we find that (i) positive economic growth rate and domestic food production
reduce the likelihood of civil conflict, in SSA and the MENA region, respectively. (ii)
Annual growth rainfall directly reduces the probability of civil conflict significantly in the
MENA region. (iii) Previous conflicts increase the possibility of civil conflicts in both
regions, have a greater impact in the MENA region. (iv) As the type of political system
and accountability are important to reduce the risks of conflict in SSA, water availability
reduces the risks of conflict in the MENA.
12
Table 2: Second stage results (GMM) for SSA and MENA from 1981-2015. Dependent
Variable: Civil conflict ≥25 deaths/ year


























F ixed effects and specific time trends are included in all regressions
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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4 Discussion and conclusion
Estimates using new cross-country panel data during 1981-2015 for SSA and the MENA
separately, show that climate change operates on economic indicators differently in
both regions. First, rainfall has a positive impact on both economic growth rate and
food production, with a statistically significant impact on the GDP per capita in the
MENA region. However, this runs counter to the finding of Barrios et al. (2010) that
precipitation is important for income growth in Africa but not for other developing
countries. Quantitatively, a one unite rise of annual rainfall growth leads to a 3.7 percent
rise in economic growth rate in MENA, compared to 4.9 percent as reported by Miguel
et al. (2004) for SSA during 1981-99. Second, with respect to the effect of temperature,
we emphasize the long known negative relationship between the increase in temperatures
and the economic growth rate. One change in annual growth temperature reduces the
economic growth rate by 0.49 pp in the MENA and 0.33 pp of domestic food production in
SSA’ sample, compared to 3.22 pp and 1.3 pp as reported by Odusola and Abidoye (2015)
and Dell et al. (2012), respectively, for Africa. Thus, periodic floods or droughts is quite
damaging to the economy i.e. food production in SSA is negatively significantly affected
through annual rainfall levels (coef. 0.023 percent). Also, annual temperature variation in
SSA affects food production negatively significantly at 5% level (point estimate of 0.332
pp), this is consistent with the finding of a case study of Kenya that temperature harms
crop production and has a greater impact than rainfall (Ochieng et al., 2016). In general,
temperature and rainfall variations are critical to the GDP growth rate in the MENA
region, and temperature growth is critical to the food production index in sub-Saharan
Africa. Water stress indicator seems to be a significant factor for food production index
in MENA. This region has the lowest freshwater resource endowment in the world,
and the demand of water and food production has been achieved through abstraction
of groundwater, water harvesting and storage, wastewater reuse, desalinization plants
and food imports (Verner, 2012), led to groundwater resource depletion (Waha et al.,
2017) due to the over-extraction of available water, which is an important input into
agricultural production. The effect of other natural resources such as the share of oil
exports of total merchandise is positively correlated with the economic growth rate but
insignificantly (the same relationship has been found by Miguel et al. (2004)), this results
indicates that both regions do not rely heavily on oil exports significantly or affected by
World oil prices, but a robust significant positive impact of total merchandise trade of a
country exports to the world on the economic growth rate in both region has been found.
Regarding the impact of the level of democracy/ autocracy on economic indicators, it
affects both economic indicators negative but only statistically significant on food index.
Descriptive statistics Table (Appendix A4) indicate that the average Polity IV estimates
of most of the political systems in our samples laying between autocracies and anocracies.
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In our estimation, this is evident from the significant negative impact of the transition
in political systems on domestic food production in both regions. In the literature, a
positive significant impact of the polity IV indicator has been found on the economic
growth (Masaki and Van de Walle, 2014) that a one-point increase in the POLITY score
is expected to produce a 0.10 percent increase in economic growth rate. While Miguel
et al. (2004) for SSA in their model specification for economic growth rate did not observe
any significant coefficient on polity IV lagged one year.
Now turning to the impact of economic shocks induced by climate variability and the
direct impact of climate variation on the incidence of civil conflict in both regions, we con-
firm the main result of Miguel et al. (2004) that the reduction in per capita income growth
induced by extreme weather events together with other country controls significantly in-
creases the probability of civil conflict in SSA. In quantitative terms, a 10% reduction in
economic growth rate leads to 1.5% increase in the probability of civil conflict in SSA. A
10% reduction in food production index leads to 2% increase in the probability of civil
conflict in the MENA. The finding of the insignificant relationship between food produc-
tion and civil conflict in SSA corresponds to the result of Buhaug et al. (2015), which
we find rather statistically significant in the MENA region. Helman et al. (2020) has
illustrated that the relationship between agricultural dependence and violence is stronger
about four fold in the Middle East, although the share of agricultural area in Africa is
greater than in the Middle East, 14% and %11, respectively, in their study. This is also
evident from the descriptive statistics Table (Appendix A4) attached to this paper. Fur-
thermore, a negative direct impact of climate variability exist between growth rainfall
and risk of conflict in the MENA, thus, it is important to assess both direct and indirect
impacts of climate change on the civil conflict when studying climate change. Chen et al.
(2016) has proved that the decrease in current rainfall compared to the previous year
increases the possibility of civil conflict. Moreover, our results proved that conflict begets
conflict in both regions, but lagged dependent variable has a greater impact in the MENA
region. The clear evidence of the impact of climate change is that higher temperature
contributed more to climate change than reduced precipitation, especially in the MENA
region. Second, results indicate that food production and economic growth rate are sta-
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Annual rainfall/mm is com-
puted by adding up all the









Total yearly rainfall/mm for
country i on a resolution of
2.5 latitude/longitude degree
nodes in the given country (see








Rainfall growth Gr rain= (rainfallt - rainfallt-
1 )/ (rainfallt-1 )
3.Temperature
(Celsius degree)
Annual averages are computed
by adding up all of monthly ob-
servations in a given year di-












1.PolityIV score Type of political regime for
each country on a range from -
10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full
democracy). Regimes that fall
into the middle of this spec-
trum are called anocracies. We
transformed Polity IV scores,
to be instead on a range from











Indicates changes in Polity IV
scores in yeart compared to
yeart-1 either toward democ-
racy or backward to autocracy
strength_gr_polityiv.
20
3.Accountability Ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100
(highest) rank, reflects percep-
tions of the extent to which a
country’s citizens can partici-
pate in selecting their govern-
ment, as well freedom of ex-








The annual level of freshwa-
ter withdrawal, calculated
averagely over each decade
divided by country area










2.Water stress% Aggregated indicator (SDG
6.4.2.) freshwater withdrawal




The share of land area that
is arable as defined by the
FAO, under permanent crops
and pastures. Land abandoned








1.Ethnicity fractionalizations index com-
puted using the same formula
applied to different underlying






























Trade exports Total merchandise trade of a
country exports to the world in




















2.Food index The aggregate volume of agri-
cultural production for each
year compared to the base
period 2004-2006, covers food
crops that are considered edi-
ble and that contain nutrients.
Coffee and tea are excluded
because, although edible, they








Any conflict resulted at least
25 battel related death per year





8 All country-year observations are coded as ones based on the type (3 and 4) and the intensity level 1



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Longitude and latitude points used in the calculation of the GPCP’ data ver-
sion 2.3 yearly rainfall estimates. For sub-Saharan Africa’ sample we used same
points that have been used by Miguel et al. (2004) .
Country Node Latitude Point Longitude Point
1.Angola 1 -16.25 S 13.75 E
2 -13.75 S 13.75 E
3 -8.75 S 13.75 E
4 -6.25 S 13.75 E
5 -16.25 S 16.25 E
6 -13.75 S 16.25 E
7 -11.25 S 16.25 E
8 -8.75 S 16.25 E
9 -6.25 S 16.25 E
10 -16.25 S 18.75 E
11 -13.75 S 18.75 E
12 -11.25 S 18.75 E
13 -8.75 S 18.75 E
14 -16.25 S 21.25 E
15 -13.75 S 21.25 E
16 -11.25 S 21.25 E
17 -8.75 S 21.25 E
18 -11.25 S 23.75 E
2.Benin 1 11.25 N 1.25 E
3.Botswana 1 -26.25 S 21.25 E
2 -23.75 S 21.25 E
3 -21.25 S 21.25 E
4 -18.75 S 21.25 E
5 -23.75 S 23.75 E
6 -21.25 S 23.75 E
7 -18.75 S 23.75 E
8 -23.75 S 26.25 E
9 -21.25 S 26.25 E
4.Burkina Faso 1 11.25 N 3.75 W
2 11.25 N 1.25 W
3 13.75 N 1.25 W
5.Burundi 1 -3.75 S 28.75 E
2 -3.75 S 31.25 E
6. Cameroon 1 3.75 N 11.25 E
2 6.25 N 11.25 E
3 3.75 N 13.75 E
4 6.25 N 13.75 E
5 8.75 N 13.75 E
7.Central African Republic 1 3.75 N 16.25 E
2 6.25 N 16.25 E
3 6.25 N 18.75 E
25
4 6.25 N 21.25 E
5 8.75 N 21.25 E
6 6.25 N 23.75 E
7 6.25 N 26.25 E
8.Chad 1 13.75 N 13.75 E
2 8.75 N 16.25 E
3 11.25 N 16.25 E
4 13.75 N 16.25 E
5 16.25 N 16.25 E
6 18.75 N 16.25 E
7 21.25 N 16.25 E
8 8.75 N 18.75 E
9 11.25 N 18.75 E
10 13.75 N 18.75 E
11 16.25 N 18.75 E
12 18.75 N 18.75 E
13 21.25 N 18.75 E
14 11.25 N 21.25 E
15 13.75 N 21.25 E
16 16.25 N 21.25 E
17 18.75 N 21.25 E
18 16.25 N 23.75 E
19 18.75 N 23.75 E
9.Congo, Brazzaville 1 -3.75 S 11.25 E
2 -3.75 S 13.75 E
3 -1.25 S 16.25 E
4 1.25 N 16.25 E
10.Congo, Kinshasa 1 -3.75 S 16.25 E
2 -6.25 S 18.75 E
3 -3.75 S 18.75 E
4 -1.25 S 18.75 E
5 1.25 N 18.75 E
6 3.75 N 18.75 E
7 -6.25 S 21.25 E
8 -3.75 S 21.25 E
9 -1.25 S 21.25 E
10 1.25 N 21.25 E
11 3.75 N 21.25 E
12 -8.75 S 23.75 E
13 -6.25 S 23.75 E
14 -3.75 S 23.75 E
15 -1.25 S 23.75 E
16 1.25 N 23.75 E
17 3.75 N 23.75 E
18 -11.25 S 26.25 E
19 -8.75 S 26.25 E
20 -6.25 S 26.25 E
21 -3.75 S 26.25 E
26
22 -1.25 S 26.25 E
23 1.25 N 26.25 E
24 3.75 N 26.25 E
25 -8.75 S 28.75 E
26 -6.25 S 28.75 E
10.Congo, Kinshasa (cont 27 -3.75 S 28.75 E
28 -1.25 S 28.75 E
29 1.25 N 28.75 E
30 3.75 N 28.75 E
11.Cote d’Ivoire 1 6.25 N 6.25 W
2 8.75 N 6.25 W
3 6.25 N 3.75 W
4 8.75 N 3.75 W
12.Djibouti 1 11.25 N 41.25 E
2 11.25 N 43.75 E
13.Equatorial Guinea 1 3.75 N 8.75 E
2 1.25 N 11.25 E
14.Eritrea 1 16.25 N 38.75 E
2 13.75 N 41.25 E
15.Ethiopia, post 1993 1 6.25 N 36.25 E
2 8.75 N 36.25 E
3 11.25 N 36.25 E
4 3.75 N 38.75 E
5 6.25 N 38.75 E
6 8.75 N 38.75 E
7 11.25 N 38.75 E
8 13.75 N 38.75 E
9 6.25 N 41.25 E
10 8.75 N 41.25 E
11 11.25 N 41.25 E
12 6.25 N 43.75 E
13 8.75 N 43.75 E
15. Ethiopia, pre 1993 1 16.25 N 38.75 E
2 13.75 N 41.25 E
3 6.25 N 36.25 E
4 8.75 N 36.25 E
5 11.25 N 36.25 E
6 3.75 N 38.75 E
7 6.25 N 38.75 E
8 8.75 N 38.75 E
9 11.25 N 38.75 E
10 13.75 N 38.75 E
11 6.25 N 41.25 E
12 8.75 N 41.25 E
13 11.25 N 41.25 E
14 6.25 N 43.75 E
15 8.75 N 43.75 E
27
16.Gabon 1 -1.25 S 11.25 E
2 -1.25 S 13.75 E
3 1.25 N 13.75 E
17.Gambia 1 13.75 N 16.25 W
2 13.75 N 13.75 W
18. Ghana 1 6.25 N 1.25 W
2 8.75 N 1.25 W
19. Guinea 1 11.25 N 13.75 W
2 11.25 N 11.25 W
3 8.75 N 8.75 W
4 11.25 N 8.75 W
20. Guinea-Bissau 1 11.25 N 16.25 W
21. Kenya 1 -1.25 S 36.25 E
2 1.25 N 36.25 E
3 3.75 N 36.25 E
4 -3.75 S 38.75 E
5 -1.25 S 38.75 E
6 1.25 N 38.75 E
7 -1.25 S 41.25 E
8 3.75 N 41.25 E
22.Lesotho 1 -28.75 S 28.75 E
23.Liberia 1 6.25 N 351.25 E
24.Madagascar 1 -23.75 S 43.75 E
2 -23.75 S 46.25 E
3 -21.25 S 46.25 E
4 -18.75 S 46.25 E
5 -16.25 S 46.25 E
6 -18.75 S 48.75 E
7 -16.25 S 48.75 E
8 -13.75 S 48.75 E
25.Malawi 1 -13.75 S 33.75 E
2 -11.25 S 33.75 E
26.Mali 1 16.25 N 1.25 E
2 18.75 N 1.25 E
3 16.25 N 3.75 E
4 18.75 N 3.75 E
5 13.75 N 11.25 W
6 13.75 N 8.75 W
7 11.25 N 6.25 W
8 13.75 N 6.25 W
9 23.75 N 6.25 W
10 13.75 N 3.75 W
11 16.25 N 3.75 W
12 18.75 N 3.75 W
13 21.25 N 3.75 W
14 23.75 N 3.75 W
15 16.25 N 1.25 W
28
16 18.75 N 1.25 W
17 21.25 N 1.25 W
27.Mauritania 1 21.25 N 16.25 W
2 16.25 N 13.75 W
3 18.75 N 13.75 W
4 21.25 N 13.75 W
5 16.25 N 11.25 W
6 18.75 N 11.25 W
7 21.25 N 11.25 W
27.Mauritania (cont 8 23.751.25 W
9 16.25 N 8.75 W
10 18.75 N 8.75 W
11 21.25 N 8.75 W
12 23.75 N 8.75 W
13 16.25 N 6.25 W
14 18.75 N 6.25 W
15 21.25 N 6.25 W
28.Mozambique 1 -23.75 S 33.75 E
2 -21.25 S 33.75 E
3 -18.75 S 33.75 E
4 -16.25 S 33.75 E
5 -18.75 S 36.25 E
6 -16.25 S 36.25 E
7 -13.75 S 36.25 E
8 -16.25 S 38.75 E
9 -13.75 S 38.75 E
10 -11.25 S 38.75 E
29.Namibia 1 -21.25 S 13.75 E
2 -18.75 S 13.75 E
3 -26.25 S 16.25 E
4 -23.75 S 16.25 E
5 -21.25 S 16.25 E
6 -18.75 S 16.25 E
7 -28.75 S 18.75 E
8 -26.25 S 18.75 E
9 -23.75 S 18.75 E
10 -21.25 S 18.75 E
11 -18.75 S 18.75 E
30.Niger 1 13.75 N 1.25 E
2 13.75 N 3.75 E
3 13.75 N 6.25 E
4 16.25 N 6.25 E
5 18.75 N 6.25 E
6 13.75 N 8.75 E
7 16.25 N 8.75 E
8 18.75 N 8.75 E
9 21.25 N 8.75 E
10 13.75 N 11.25 E
29
11 16.25 N 11.25 E
12 18.75 N 11.25 E
13 21.25 N 11.25 E
14 16.25 N 13.75 E
15 18.75 N 13.75 E
16 21.25 N 13.75 E
31.Nigeria 1 8.75 N 3.75 E
2 11.25 N 3.75 E
3 6.25 N 6.25 E
4 8.75 N 6.25 E
31.Nigeria (cont 5 11.25 N 6.25 E
6 6.25 N 8.75 E
7 8.75 N 8.75 E
8 11.25 N 8.75 E
9 8.75 N 11.25 E
10 11.25 N 11.25 E
11 11.25 N 13.75 E
32.Rwanda 1 -1.25 S 28.75 E
2 -1.25 S 31.25 E
33.Senegal 1 13.75 N 16.25 W
2 16.25 N 16.25 W
3 13.75 N 13.75 W
34.Sierra Leone 1 8.75 N 11.25 W
35.Somalia 1 1.25 N 41.25 E
2 1.25 N 43.75 E
3 3.75 N 43.75 E
4 3.75 N 46.25 E
5 6.25 N 46.25 E
6 8.75 N 46.25 E
7 6.25 N 48.75 E
8 8.75 N 48.75 E
9 11.25 N 48.75 E
36. South Africa 1 -33.75 S 18.75 E
2 -31.25 S 18.75 E
3 -33.75 S 21.25 E
4 -31.25 S 21.25 E
5 -28.75 S 21.25 E
6 -33.75 S 23.75 E
7 -31.25 S 23.75 E
8 -28.75 S 23.75 E
9 -26.25 S 23.75 E
10 -33.75 S 26.25 E
11 -31.25 S 26.25 E
12 -28.75 S 26.25 E
13 -26.25 S 26.25 E
14 -31.25 S 28.75 E
15 -26.25 S 28.75 E
16 -23.75 S 28.75 E
30
17 -28.75 S 31.25 E
18 -23.75 S 31.25 E
37.Sudan 1 8.75 N 23.75 E
2 11.25 N 23.75 E
3 13.75 N 23.75 E
4 8.75 N 26.25 E
5 11.25 N 26.25 E
6 13.75 N 26.25 E
7 16.25 N 26.25 E
8 18.75 N 26.25 E
9 21.25 N 26.25 E
37.Sudan (cont 10 6.25 N 28.75 E
11 8.75 N 28.75 E
12 11.25 N 28.75 E
13 13.75 N 28.75 E
14 16.25 N 28.75 E
15 18.75 N 28.75 E
16 21.25 N 28.75 E
17 6.25 N 31.25 E
18 8.75 N 31.25 E
19 11.25 N 31.25 E
20 13.75 N 31.25 E
21 16.25 N 31.25 E
22 18.75 N 31.25 E
23 21.25 N 31.25 E
24 6.25 N 33.75 E
25 8.75 N 33.75 E
26 11.25 N 33.75 E
27 13.75 N 33.75 E
28 16.25 N 33.75 E
29 18.75 N 33.75 E
30 21.25 N 33.75 E
31 13.75 N 36.25 E
32 16.25 N 36.25 E
33 18.75 N 36.25 E
34 21.25 N 36.25 E
38.Swaziland 1 -26.25 S 31.25 E
39.Tanzania 1 -6.25 S 31.25 E
2 -3.75 S 31.25 E
3 -1.25 S 31.25 E
4 -8.75 S 33.75 E
5 -6.25 S 33.75 E
6 -3.75 S 33.75 E
7 -1.25 S 33.75 E
8 -11.25 S 36.25 E
9 -8.75 S 36.25 E
10 -6.25 S 36.25 E
11 -3.75 S 36.25 E
31
12 -8.75 S 38.75 E
13 -6.25 S 38.75 E
40.Togo 1 6.25 N 1.25 E
2 8.75 N 1.25 E
41.Uganda 1 1.25 N 31.25 E
2 3.75 N 31.25 E
3 1.25 N 33.75 E
4 -1.25 S 31.25 E
6 -1.25 S 29.75 E
5 3.75 N 33.75 E
42.Zambia 1 -16.25 S 23.75 E
2 -13.75 S 23.75 E
3 -16.25 S 26.25 E
4 -13.75 S 26.25 E
42.Zambia (cont 5 -16.25 S 28.75 E
6 -13.75 S 28.75 E
7 -11.25 S 28.75 E
8 -13.75 S 31.25 E
9 -11.25 S 31.25 E
10 -8.75 S 31.25 E
43.Zimbabwe 1 -18.75 S 26.25 E
2 -21.25 S 28.75 E
3 -18.75 S 28.75 E
4 -21.25 S 31.25 E
5 -18.75 S 31.25 E
6 -16.25 S 31.25 E
MENA’ countries
44.Tunisia 1 33.75 N 8.75 E
2 36.25 N 8.75 E
45.Morocco 1 26.25 N 8.75 W
2 26.25 N 11.25 W
3 28.75 N 8.75 W
4 31.25 N 6.25 W
5 31.25 N 8.75 W
6 33.75 N 3.75 W
7 33.75 N 6.25 W
46.Algeria 1 21.25 N 1.25 E
2 21.25 N 3.75 E
3 21.25 N 6.25 E
4 23.75 N 1.25 E
5 23.75 N 3.75 E
6 23.75 N 6.25 E
7 23.75 N 8.75 E
8 23.75 N 11.25 E
9 23.75 N 1.25 W
10 26.25 N 1.25 E
11 26.25 N 3.75 E
12 26.25 N 6.25 E
32
13 26.25 N 8.75 E
14 26.25 N 1.25 W
15 26.25 N 3.75 W
16 26.25 N 6.25 W
17 28.75 N 1.25 W
18 28.75 N 1.25 E
19 28.75 N 3.75 E
20 28.75 N 6.25 E
21 28.75 N 6.25 W
22 28.75 N 8.75 E
23 28.75 N 3.75 W
24 31.25 N 1.25 W
25 31.25 N 1.25 E
26 31.25 N 3.75 E
27 31.25 N 3.75 W
28 31.25 N 6.25 E
29 31.25 N 8.75 E
30 33.75 N 1.25 W
31 33.75 N 1.25 E
32 33.75 N 3.75 E
33 33.75 N 6.25 E
34 36.25 N 1.25 E
35 36.25 N 3.75 E
36 36.25 N 6.25 E
47.Yemen 1 13.75 N 43.75 E
2 13.75 N 46.25 E
3 16.25 N 43.75 E
4 16.25 N 46.25 E
5 16.25 N 48.75 E
6 16.25 N 51.25 E
7 18.75 N 51.25 E
48.Oman 1 18.75 N 53.75 E
2 18.75 N 56.25 E
3 21.25 N 58.75 E
4 21.25 N 56.25 E
5 23.75 N 56.25 E
6 26.25 N 56.25 E
49.Bahrain 1 26.25 N 51.25 E
50.United Arab Emirates 1 23.75 N 53.75 E
51.Kuwait 1 28.75 N 48.75 E
52.Qatar 1 26.25 N 51.25 E
53.Saudi Arabia 1 21.25 N 51.25 E
2 21.25 N 48.75 E
3 21.25 N 46.25 E
4 21.25 N 43.75 E
5 21.25 N 41.25 E
6 21.25 N 53.75 E
7 23.75 N 38.75 E
33
8 23.75 N 41.25 E
9 23.75 N 43.75 E
10 23.75 N 46.25 E
11 23.75 N 48.75 E
12 23.75 N 51.25 E
13 26.25 N 43.75 E
14 26.25 N 41.25 E
15 26.25 N 38.75 E
16 26.25 N 48.75 E
17 26.25 N 46.25 E
18 28.75 N 36.25 E
19 28.75 N 38.75 E
20 28.75 N 41.25 E
21 28.75 N 46.25 E
22 28.75 N 43.75 E
23 31.25 N 38.75 E
24 31.25 N 41.25 E
54.Israel 1 31.25 N 33.75 E
55.Jordan 1 31.25 N 36.25 E
56.Egypt 1 26.25 N 26.25 E
2 26.25 N 33.75 E
3 31.25 N 31.25 E
4 28.75 N 31.25 E
5 26.25 N 31.25 E
6 23.75 N 31.25 E
7 23.75 N 33.75 E
8 28.75 N 33.75 E
9 23.75 N 28.75 E
10 23.75 N 26.25 E
11 26.25 N 28.75 E
12 28.75 N 28.75 E
13 28.75 N 26.25 E
14 31.25 N 26.25 E
15 31.25 N 33.75 E
57.Lebanon 1 33.75 N 36.25 E
58.Turkey 1 36.25 N 33.75 E
2 36.25 N 36.25 E
3 38.75 N 43.75 E
4 38.75 N 28.75 E
5 38.75 N 31.25 E
6 38.75 N 33.75 E
7 38.75 N 36.25 E
8 38.75 N 38.75 E
9 38.75 N 41.25 E
10 41.25 N 41.25 E
11 41.25 N 36.25 E
12 41.25 N 33.75 E
13 41.25 N 28.75 E
34
59.Syria 1 33.75 N 36.25 E
2 33.75 N 38.75 E
3 36.25 N 38.75 E
4 36.25 N 41.25 E
60.Iraq 1 31.25 N 43.75 E
2 31.25 N 46.25 E
3 33.75 N 41.25 E
4 33.75 N 43.75 E
5 36.25 N 43.75 E
61.Iran 1 26.25 N 58.75 E
2 26.25 N 61.25 E
3 28.75 N 51.25 E
4 28.75 N 53.75 E
5 28.75 N 56.25 E
6 28.75 N 58.75 E
7 28.75 N 61.25 E
8 31.25 N 48.75 E
9 31.25 N 51.25 E
10 31.25 N 53.75 E
11 31.25 N 56.25 E
12 31.25 N 58.75 E
13 31.25 N 61.25 E
14 33.75 N 46.25 E
15 33.75 N 48.75 E
16 33.75 N 51.25 E
17 33.75 N 53.75 E
18 33.75 N 56.25 E
19 33.75 N 58.75 E
20 36.25 N 46.25 E
21 36.25 N 48.75 E
22 36.25 N 51.25 E
23 36.25 N 53.75 E
24 36.25 N 56.25 E
25 36.25 N 58.75 E
26 38.75 N 46.25 E
9.
9For SSA’ sample, it is mentioned by MSS: No degree grid node fell within the national boundaries
for five small African countries–Burundi, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Rwanda, so in these
cases they assigned rainfall measures from the node nearest to their borders. We do so for MENA’
sample, countries where no degree grid node fell within their boundaries are: Lebanon, Bahrain,
Kuwait, Israel, and Qatar
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